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BOOK REVIEW
THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION.
Edited by Richard A. Posner and Kenneth E. Scott. Boston and
Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1980. Pp. x, 384.
Reviewed by Larry E. Ribstein* and C. Paul Rogers;*
The Economics of Corporate Law and Securities Regulation
represents an ambitious attempt to provide-in a compact, accessi-
ble format-a fairly comprehensive sampler of economic thinking
about corporations and corporate law. Not surprisingly, questions
of economic efficiency permeate most of the book's selections.
Wealth maximization appears to raise two related inquiries in the
corporate context. First, do corporations generally behave in a
wealth maximizing manner and second, does the law encourage or
retard efficient corporate conduct? The readings raise these ques-
tions and systematically suggest answers by focusing on the various
aspects of corporate conduct.
I.
Organized into four sections, the book begins with an excerpt
from Coase's The Nature of the Firm,' an essay that introduces
the corporation in its economic context as a type of "firm." The
second chapter provides an introduction to those economic forces
that affect corporate managers. The chapter emphasizes that al-
though, as Berle and Means concluded,2 shareholders may not con-
* Professor of Law, Mercer University. B.A., 1968, Johns Hopkins University; J.D.,
1972, University of Chicago.
** Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. B.A., 1970, J.D., 1973,
University of Texas; L.L. M., 1977, Columbia University.
This Book Review evolved from an informal discussion group on the economics of cor-
porate law held throughout the spring semester, 1981, at the Southern Methodist University
Law School. Group participants included the reviewers, Alan Bromberg, Joseph Norton, and
Peter Winship. The reviewers owe a debt of gratitude to the group participants; however all
opinions, views, errors, and omissions are attributable to the reviewers alone.
1. THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 3-7 (R. Posner &
K. Scott eds. 1980) (quoting Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937)).
2. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
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trol directly corporate managers in public corporations, market
forces operate to align management with the profit-maximization
goals of shareholders. This theme continues into the third chapter
dealing with corporate social responsibility: the same market con-
straints that unify management and shareholders' interests also
limit the extent to which management can and should make deci-
sions that benefit society.
The next'section of the book deals with various specific as-
pects of market restraints on management. Chapter Four presents
the debate about whether permitting states to compete in setting
corporati6n management rules harms shareholders or whether
market forces operate to produce efficient fiduciary standards.
Chapter Five examines insider trading to determine if market
forces operate to prevent insiders from realizing gains that may be
unfair to investors or to the corporations whose stock is being
traded on inside information. The chapter also considers the effect
of insider trading regulations.
The last two chapters of the second section examine the mar-
ket itself. Chapter Six deals with the efficient market hypothesis
and its corollary, the portfolio theory of investment. After present-
ing the theory that the market accurately values corporate stocks,
the book in Chapter Seven examines the hypothesis that the cor-
porate control market disciplines inefficient management by
permitting firms to retain new controllers who can increase the
firm's value. The excerpts in this chapter consider the extent to
which gains may be achieved through acquisition, and the extent
to which transaction costs and regulations limit these gains and,
therefore, inhibit the acquisition market.
The book's third section deals with creditors' interests. Chap-
ter Eight presents the Modigliani and Miller thesis$ that a firm
cannot reap a financial advantage solely because of its decision to
adopt a particular capital structure, and Chapter Nine presents the
analogous thesis that a firm cannot reap a market advantage solely
because of a dividend policy. Other excerpts in the chapter criti-
cally analyze and qualify these theories. A central point emerges
from the selections: Market forces protect creditors as well as
shareholders.
The final section examines federal securities regulation. Chap-
3. See Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the The-
ory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261-97 (1958); Modigliani & Miller, Dividend Policy,
Growth, and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411-33 (1961).
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ter Ten considers the appropriate role of disclosure regulations in
light of market forces that encourage accurate disclosure. Chapter
Eleven presents studies by Stigler and Benston on the performance
of the Securities and Exchange Commission and critiques of these
studies by Irwin Friend and others.
II.
To evaluate this book as a teaching tool one must consider
several questions. First, of what value is an economic analysis of
law? Second, should one consider economics in a corporations or
securities law course? Third, does this book offer a worthwhile ap-
proach to bringing economics into the corporate law curriculum?
Last, how well has this approach been executed in the book?
It may be a bit late to ponder the value of an economic analy-
sis of the law. Economic legal theorists are both extending and
deepening the thinking about economics' role in facilitating an
understanding of law.4 This new thinking encompasses broad
nonmarket areas of the law, including privacy,5 criminal law,' and
constitutional law.' In addition, scholars now are attempting to
transcend the descriptive or "positive" focus of the analy-
sis-arguing that the law develops in accordance with economic
principles such as the desire of individuals in society to maximize
their wealth-and articulate a "normative" theory of economic le-
gal analysis-arguing that the legal system should be founded
upon economic principles such as wealth maximization.8 Indeed,
4. See, e.g., W. HIRSCH, LAw AND ECONOMICS (1979); Symposium-Change in the
Common Law: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 189-427 (1980); Sympo-
sium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485-770 (1980); A Response to
the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 811-972 (1980).
5. The Law and Economics of Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 621-842 (1980); Posner, The
Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978); Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28
BUFFALO L. Rav. 1 (1979).
6. See, e.g., W. HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 200-12; Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforce-
ment of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980); Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts of
Punishment, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 71 (1980).
7. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 497-552 (2d ed. 1977); Coase, The Mar-
ket for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REv. PAPERS & PRoc. 384 (1974);
Michelman, Constitutions, Statutes, and the Theory of Efficient Adjudication, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 431 (1980); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
8. See, e.g., Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Com-
mon Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980); Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics,
and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979). But see Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J.
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the economic approach to law has taken on the trappings of a new
and competing jurisprudential philosophy.'
The inherent persuasiveness of an economic analysis of law
provides a sound basis for all this scholarly proselytizing. Samuel
Butler recognized this persuasiveness more than a century ago
when he referred to certain rebels in Erewhon society.
But the main argument on which they rely is that of economy: for they know
that they will sooner gain their end by appealing to men's pockets, in which
they have generally something of their own, than to their heads, which con-
tain for the most part little but borrowed or stolen property; and also, they
believe it to be the readiest test and the one which has most to show for
itself. If a course of conduct can be shown to cost a country less, and this by
no dishonourable saving and with no indirectly increased expenditure in
other ways, they hold that it requires a good deal to upset the arguments in
favour of its being adopted. 10
The value of an economic analysis of law is not, however, univer-
sally acknowledged. Legal education traditionally has emphasized
the complexity of our legal system. The notion that such an intri-
cate order of rules, obligations, freedoms, limitations, and proce-
dures can be reduced to a central guiding principle is anathema to
the way American lawyers have been trained to think about the
law.1' Furthermore, lawyers who are taught not to accept a conten-
tion at face value must be shown why the law is efficient before
they will believe that it does in fact have that attribute, 12 particu-
larly since wealth maximization as a standard for conflict resolu-
tion strikes many as both intuitively unappealing and logically
troublesome. It is difficult to accept the idea that judges-who pre-
sumably possess noneconomic characteristics of fairness, wisdom,
impartiality, compassion, insight, and skill-decide cases simply to
achieve the most efficient result even when they have had no train-
ing that enables them competently to discern the most efficient re-
LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980); Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8.HoFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980).
9. Posner has recently written that "the positive economic theory has the cardinal vir-
tue of being the only positive theory of the common law that is in contention at this time."
Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 294 (1979)
(footnote omitted). See also Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 905 (1980); Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L. REV. 757 (1975).
10. S. BUTLER, EREWHON 147-48 (new ed. 1933).
11. See, e.g., Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 1010-11 (1978); Michelman, Norms and
Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1044-47 (1978).
12. For theoretical arguments addressing the why proposition, see Goodman, An Eco-
nomic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); Priest, The
Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977);
Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
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sult.13 The increasing normative bent of some positivistic legal eco-
nomic writers probably contributes to the antireductionist
skepticism.14
Legal economists, however, increasingly are responding to the
skeptical and the diffident. They are seeking to make their theories
more palatable by demonstrating both that efficiency is not incon-
sistent with other deeply held societal values and that, in an adver-
sary system, wealth maximization for society as a whole may be an
appropriate goal in dispute r3solution. 5 On the other hand, some
scholars are fashioning increasingly sophisticated and convincing
arguments to refute the positive notion of efficiency."
III.
In order to accept the relevance of economics to corporate law,
however, one need not view economic theory as the sole guiding
principle to understanding our legal system. Just as the law of con-
tracts concerns bargained-for exchanges of economic value,' 7 the
law of corporations concerns firm transactions, whether conducted
internally or externally, that have financial consequences. Corpo-
rate law-a specialized form of commercial law-arguably ought to
have an economic conscience.
Economic theory is not only a useful tool for analysis of corpo-
ration and securities law, but it enhances the corporations curricu-
lum for pedagogical reasons. The judicial opinions students must
study in this area often are little more than bundles of facts tied
together with metaphorical ribbons. An economic analysis offers
the student possible explanations for results in cases that are not
adequately justified by the opinions themselves. For example, such
explanations are helpful in cases dealing with areas like piercing
the corporate veil, subordination, and unintentional partnership.
13. See, e.g., Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics and
Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 307, 311 (1979). See generally Baker, The Ideology of the Economic
Analysis of Law, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PuB. AFF. 3 (1975); Markovits, Legal Analysis and the
Economic Analysis of Allocative Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 811 (1980); Schwartz, Eco-
nomics, Wealth Distribution, and Justice, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 799.
14. See authorities cited note 8 supra.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33
STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981); Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980); Rizzo, supra note 8. See also Kronman, Contract Law and
Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980).
17. Exchanges like this have been described as "quintessentially economic." THE Eco-
NOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1 (A. Kronman & R. Posner eds. 1979).
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Also, the availability of economic analysis as a criterion encourages
students to assess critically the results of cases rather than to ac-
cept blindly the courts' metaphors. Robert Rabin noted that tradi-
tional law school courses treat "rules of law. . . as if they have the
same self-contained quality as those governing basketball or
chess."18 Finally, a collection of supplementary readings is particu-
larly appropriate for courses taken by second and third year law
students. Little justification exists for immersing these students
exclusively in appellate decisions, and a steady diet of cases pro-
duces boredom.
Of course, one must not expect too much of economic analysis.
The discipline does not provide a neat, clear theory with which to
wholly order and concretize corporate law concepts. The Posner
and Scott readings show that significant controversy still sur-
rounds the economic consequences of the Berle and Means hypoth-
esis of separation of ownership and control, the causes and effects
of corporate growth by acquisition, and the economic underpin-
nings of perfect capital markets. The effect pure economic incen-
tives have on many facets of corporate conduct simply is not clear.
IV.
Although economic analysis may prove a valuable supplement
in corporate law courses, some question exists whether the Posner
and Scott book presents the proper medium for incorporating this
discipline into the curriculum. First, the book's general approach is
suspect because the readings are limited to materials from econom-
ics literature. The preface explains that "this focus is virtually dic-
tated, in the present instance, by the sheer volume of the relevant
economic literature." 19 Even if the materials could not have been
presented more succinctly, however, the important question is
whether a reader devoted exclusively to economics is a useful sup-
plement to the already-crowded courses on corporations and secur-
ities. 0 Moreover, the danger exists that students will be seduced
into ignoring the limited degree to which economic theory can pro-
vide answers to corporate law questions.2"
18. Rabin, Preface to PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW at x (R. Rabin ed. 1976).
19. Posner & Scott, Preface to EcoNoMICs OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGU-
LATION, supra note 1, at ix.
20. The tradeoff of course coverage for additional reading is ultimately a personal
choice. But an economic reader may not present the supplementary breadth that many tra-
ditionalists seek and may thus, in many instances, color the personal choice negatively.
21. Rabin's Perspectives on Tort Law presents an instructive comparison. PERSPEC-
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Assuming for the moment that one accepts the general value
of a reader limited to the economics of corporations and securities,
more particular problems exist with the Posner and Scott book.
For example, even if the editors choose to exclude a presentation
of alternate perspectives, the student should be informed through
an introductory chapter of both the existence of these other per-
spectives and the general nature and limitations of economic the-
ory. The student who opens this book in hopes of answering the
question "What is economics?" is confronted only with "The The-
ory of the Firm." The book therefore disorients the student at a
time when it should be spurring interest in the material. And if the
theory of the firm must begin the specifically economic-oriented
readings (since it is the cornerstone of an economic analysis of cor-
porate law) a general introduction could have preceded the firm
material.
Another problem with the book's approach is that the excerpts
have been inadequately related to those legal issues dominating
the typical corporations course. In general, the book's editors seem
more concerned with the economics of corporations and securities
than with the economics of corporation law and securities regula-
tion. For example, the readings begin with a debate between Coase
and Knight as to the theory of the firm22 and, specifically, the sig-
nificance of the pure profit concept. There is not a word to help
the student understand how all this bears on corporate law. The
same criticism could be made of Chapter Two, "The Economics of
the Corporate Firm"; Chapter Six, "Modern Finance Theory and
the Efficient Market Hypothesis"; Chapter Eight, "Capital Struc-
tures" (with the exception of the excerpt from Posner's The Rights
TIVES ON TORT LAW, supra note 18. In that book, economic theory competes with moral and
historical perspectives. Although there may not be as wide a selection of such writings from
which to choose in the corporate area, there is a sufficient quantity to comprise an interest-
ing reader. A notable example of a noneconomic perspective on corporate law can be found
in Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REv. 505 (1977).
It should be pointed out that the economic focus may present a problem with respect to
other readers. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW (T. Calvani & J. Siegfried eds. 1979);
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (B. Ackerman ed. 1975); THE ECONOMICS OF CON-
TRACT LAW, supra note 17. See also Rogers, Book Review, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1039, 1044
(1980) (reviewing THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 17). Of course, antitrust
law may not be subject to this criticism, since in that field the economic impact of conduct
to a great extent determines the legal norm which is applied. See, e.g., Morgan, Book Re-
view, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1523, 1524 (1980) (reviewing ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
LAW, supra).
22. ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 1, at 3-9
(quoting excerpts from Coase, supra note 1; Knight, Profit and Entrepreneurial Functions,
2 J. ECON. HIsT. 126 (1942)).
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of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations);23 and Chapter Nine, "Div-
idend Policy." The law student who is confronting this material for
the first time needs some guidance in considering the relevance to
the law of corporations of market efficiency or the effect on a firm's
value of its capital structure or dividend policy.
This difficulty is noteworthy particularly because it exacer-
bates the defects that plague many of the casebooks the Posner
and Scott book would supplement. Because the average law stu-
dent lacks a basic understanding of business, the traditional case
approach to legal studies tends to make the corporations course
more tedious and less valuable than it could be. Students need a
bridge from the abstractions of appellate opinions to the real
world. This bridge could be provided both by contextual notes
describing the business setting and by problems illustrating how
the legal problems studied in the course actually arise. The Posner
and Scott book does not lend itself to this approach, since it takes
the student deeply into the realm of theory instead of helping stu-
dents connect corporate law to the business world.
One could easily link directly the economic analysis and the
legal issues examined in corporations and securities courses. In the
Brudney and Chirelstein casebook,24 for example, materials on the
portfolio theory and efficient markets are followed by a section en-
titled "Legal Implications of Efficient Market Theory." 25 This ap-
proach permits the student to use economic analysis in formulating
solutions to the practical problems arising in connection with par-
ticular legal issues.
Within their present format the editors could have used the
notes and questions that follow each chapter to tie more clearly
economics to law. Their notes and questions, however, are prima-
rily concerned with further developing the economic issues raised
in the selected readings. There are exceptions. For example, the
editors ask whether, in view of the writings on dividends, a court
should concern itself with a firm's dividend policy.28 More ques-
tions like this would have enhanced the book's worth both contex-
23. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499
(1976).
24. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed.
1979).
25. Id. at 1143-1235.
26. ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 1, at 314.
For other examples, see id. at 111-17 (quoting excerpts from Dyer, An Essay on Federalism
in Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 7; S. Peck & J. Udinsky, Tender




An additional problem arises from the very nature of the ex-
cerpts themselves. Most originally were written for an audience
well versed in economics and already familiar with the terminology
and the issues addressed. Thus, the law student frequently is con-
fronted with explanations he or she may find unintelligible and,
therefore, not particularly enlightening. For example, consider the
following excerpt:
1. The Efficient Markets/Rational Explanations Hypothesis....
Fama formalizes the efficient markets model by stipulating that deviations of
returns to asset i, R. from their equilibrium expected values, E (R t /4t-1),
conditional on the information set available at time t-l, Pt-j, are not system-
atically different from zero. In other words, the "fair game" variable,
rit = Rit - E (Rit A t-1)
has a mean of zero. Given some economic model of equilibrium expected re-
turns to assets, which might incorporate risk premia, term premia, or other
differences among assets, market efficiency can be tested by examining the
statistical properties of the fair game variable, E t.2
Quantitative material can be made intelligible and interesting to
law students by presenting it in textual, summary form and in ex-
cerpts from less technical articles. The Brudney and Chirelstein28
and Klein2 9 texts demonstrate this worthwhile approach. Of
course, these texts may sacrifice some precision in the presentation
of the theories and ideas, but students must be given an opportu-
nity to become familiar with these difficult concepts before they
can be expected to manipulate them with technical dexterity.
In fairness one should note that the book does a good job of
developing corporate economics. For example, Chapter Two
presents an interesting set of variations on the theme of the rela-
tionship between the firm's economic structure and management
behavior. The first four excerpts in Chapter Eight and the three
excerpts in Chapter Nine develop the effects of capital structure
and dividend policy on firm value by presenting a progression of
papers, beginning with seminal works by Modigliani and Miller s°
and continuing with related and responsive papers. Chapter Eleven
27. Id. at 186-87 (quoting Schwert, Working Paper No. GPB78-7, Center for Research
in Government Policy and Business, Graduate School of Management, University of
Rochester).
28. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 24.
29. W. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE (1980).
30. See Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the The-
ory of Investment, supra note 3; Modigliani & Miller, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the
Valuation of Shares, supra note 3.
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includes lively debates on the Stigler and Benston evaluations of
the effects of federal securities regulation.3 1 Additionally, each
chapter includes an introductory section that clearly and concisely
ties together the chapter as well as the entire book.
The Posner and Scott book does not deliver on its promise to
provide suitable supplementary reading for a corporations course.
Those who wish to bring economics into the course would do better
to assign either the Klein3 2 or the Brudney and Chirelstein 3' books
discussed above. Those who wish to supplement the course with
excerpts from the literature would do better to prepare their own
balanced set of materials. Yet, since the book does a good job of
presenting the economics of corporations and securities, it is, how-
ever, a suitable text for a seminar limited to that specific subject.
31. ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 1, at
346-80.
32. W. KLEIN, supra note 29.
33. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 24.
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